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China’s encounters with modernity have drawn steadyattention from generations of scholars. Recently, his-torians have begun investigating the transformation
from Qing empire to modern Chinese nation state in the
ethnically diverse Inner Asian frontier territories (Northeast
China, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet). (2) By
1800, the Qing entity contained multiple territories and rul-
ing systems. The power to allocate resources, administer jus-
tice, or use legitimate force was, in some cases, lodged only
tentatively in the central state, which, given its limitations,
judiciously delegated authority to hybrid institutions, includ-
ing the Tibetan Buddhist clergy, Turkic leaders (begs), and
the hereditary nobility from Mongol banners. Hybridity
defined the high Qing state in the eighteenth century, and
there is reason to believe that the Qianlong emperor (r.
1736-1799) revelled in the diversity of his realm. (3) By the
1820s, however, some Han intellectuals argued for eradicat-
ing hybrid institutions and reorganizing frontiers using the
institutions of China proper (neidi). The chaos of the mid-
nineteenth century made these plans impractical as state
capacity declined in many frontiers. Beginning in the 1870s,
there were strenuous efforts to reverse this trajectory, and it
was at this time that some officials fought not just to rebuild
state capacity but to claim for the central state the powers
that were once delegated to hybrid institutions. The model
of centralization chosen, moreover, was China proper’s
provincial (xingsheng) and county (junxian) system.  
In calling for provincial governance in the Inner Asian terri-
tories, reformers also sought to transform society. Not only
did they wish to replace local elites with ethnic Han officials,
they also argued for assimilating non-Han people to Chinese
ways, encouraging Han migration into frontier areas, and
developing local economic productivity to serve the state.
Scholars have pointed to this as a turning point in Chinese
history, a point when beleaguered Qing rulers, worn down by
rebellion, threatened by foreign imperialism, and on the
defensive against Han nationalism, definitively departed from
earlier “pluralist” practices of empire in which non-Han had
played important roles. (4) What has rarely been emphasised
about the “provincialising” (transformation into provinces) of
Inner Asian regions is that it was a contested process drawn
out over decades. The first territory to be transformed into a
province was Xinjiang, in 1884, but it was not until the first
decade of the twentieth century that provincialisation was
seriously considered for other Inner Asian lands. From 1877,
when Zuo Zongtang submitted his first plan for Xinjiang, to
1907, when the court entertained a thorough proposal for
provincialising Mongolia, three critical decades passed,
decades in which Chinese politics were utterly changed by
new ideas about the state and its relations to frontier lands
and peoples. In the end, the actual implementation of provin-
cial-style institutions was piecemeal and disrupted by the
1911 revolution. Given these qualifications, it is important to
re-evaluate the late Qing approach to Inner Asia.
This paper synthesises recent work on the process of trans-
forming Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet, 1877-1911, and it
emphasises three observations designed to provoke contin-
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1. I thank Cynthia Chen for research assistance and the Wellesley College Social Science
Summer Research Program for funding.
2. For one nice overview, see Joseph Esherick, “How the Qing became China,” in Joseph
Esherick, et al. (eds), Empire to Nation, Lanham, Md., Rowman and Littlefied. 2006, pp.
229-259. 
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This article explores late Qing (1877-1911) state-building in Inner Asia (Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet) in three ways.
It demonstrates how efforts to replace hybrid, imperial institutions with Chinese-style administration were
contingent and unpredictable processes. It compares elite-state relations, in Inner Asia and China proper, to explore
the diverse impacts on Mongol, Tibetan, and Han elites. Finally, it surveys reform-era (1898-1911) media to reveal
how Han elites conceived of Inner Asian territories and peoples in new ways and with enduring consequences. 
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ued debate and inquiry. The first is that the decisions to
implement new governing systems in Xinjiang, Mongolia,
and Tibet were neither easy nor inevitable. There was oppo-
sition, and alternatives were suggested. While we are
increasingly aware that the contingent events and choices of
the Republican era (1912-1949) structured important
changes in ethnic relations, we have not brought the same
level of interrogation to the late Qing. We know, for
instance, that Republican state-builders imagined Inner Asia
as part of the new nation, scholars adopted new techniques
for producing knowledge about non-Han peoples, (5) the
Communist Party in Yan’an developed policies for dealing
with non-Han, (6) and events led to ethnogenesis among
some peripheral peoples. (7) However, we are unsure about
the historical legacies shaping such developments because
the continuities from and ruptures with the late Qing are
unclear. It is important, therefore, to treat as contingent the
developments in Inner Asia, ca 1877-1911, and to identify
any significant features that emerged from those years.
Second, because provincialising policies were designed to
reorganise relations between state and elites in Inner Asia,
this topic should be studied within the context of state-elite
relations, already a well-developed area of inquiry for late
Qing China proper. There is good evidence that, in the last
decades of Qing rule, the recovery from rebellion and the
efforts to increase state capacity created new opportunities
for a Han “managerial elite.” Elites claimed new roles in
administering local society and developed new media for
comment on imperial policy. (8) In many cases, there were ten-
sions between state and elite, but at the same time there were
also important shared networks and goals. How does this
compare to the evolution of relations in frontier areas, where
elites were not Han literati but Mongol nobles, Khampa
hereditary rulers, or Tibetan-Buddhist lamas? In addition to
these comparisons, we must assess the influence of Inner
Asia on reformist Han elites. Beginning in the 1890s, the
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reformist media provided a forum for a new type of “public
opinion.” What did this nascent public opinion have to say
about frontier peoples and territories? This paper makes an
initial survey of the reformist press to evaluate emerging dis-
courses about Inner Asian territory and peoples.
Third, the study of late Qing Inner Asia must be placed with-
in the context of recent scholarship that emphasises cognition
and modern state-making. Modern state-building is a creative
process, both in terms of institutions developed and ideas for-
mulated. Prasenjit Duara’s recent work on Manchukuo
emphasises that “recognition of a nation was — and is — not
merely a political act; it has a cognitive and ontological
dimension.” (9) If I read him correctly, Duara believes that
“latecomers,” late-forming nation-states (including China),
were confronted with difficult and somewhat unique tasks. To
build modern states that fit within the global system, Chinese
first sought to maximise territory and militarise boundaries;
this meant eradicating “informal arrangements [and] multiple
sovereignties” in Inner Asian territories. Even as the state
eradicated hybrid institutions, however, it had to represent a
diverse and messy post-imperial conglomerate as an integrat-
ed whole, where less-civilised frontier and civilised centre
shared a common political identity. To create such represen-
tations required new intellectual and administrative technolo-
gies (ethnologies, surveys, censuses), and Duara argues that
Chinese learned these approaches from Japan. Forced to
confront Japanese imperialism in Manchukuo, Chinese
began to conceive of frontiers as “vital national territories”
and to adopt the disciplines of anthropology, history, and
geography to locate “these places and people within the
national narrative.” In the end, Nationalist policy-makers
responded by bringing institutionalised anthropology and
geography — as well as new schools and censuses — to bear
on the challenge of extending administration into frontiers. (10)
This is compelling and, I believe, accurate stuff, except for
the implication that it was entirely new in the 1930s. In the
first decade of the twentieth century, Han elites lamented
foreign threats to Inner Asia and developed a symbolic
vocabulary to demonstrate how these regions “screened”
China proper and made possible the livelihoods of millions.
This was an early articulation of the importance of frontiers
as national territory, and intellectuals also sought to intro-
duce methods for producing knowledge about the frontiers
and their peoples. Certainly anthropology as we know it was
not selected, but officials and writers did urge surveys that
would examine the exotic traditions of Mongolia and Tibet,
and geography was singled out as a critical discipline. The
geography considered important, moreover, was not con-
tained in traditional Qing gazetteers or travel accounts.
Instead, writers specifically identified European practices of
surveying and record-keeping as foundations for knowledge
and power. These developments, along with the plans for
comprehensive Chinese education of Inner Asian youth,
suggest that important cognitive transformations were
already taking place in the late Qing.
These developments should make us pause to consider the
relationship between Inner Asia and the Chinese state.
Recently, Rebecca Karl and Peter Zarrow have argued that
1898 marks the onset of a period when “China was com-
pelled to… grapple with the multifaceted crises produced by
its forced incorporation into the uneven global system of
states, capital, and knowledge.” (11) They place the late Qing
at the centre of China’s initial confrontations with moderni-
ty. Similarly, the modern challenges of conceiving a nation
in a multi-ethnic empire began not in the Republican period
but in the last decades of the Qing. Reformist elites already
knew that when it came to knowledge about Inner Asia they
were at a disadvantage to foreign powers. The timing of this
recognition, moreover, is important, because it gave rise to
certain ideas that would shape subsequent developments
and, to some degree, influence thinking into the present. The  pl ura lis t  em pi re
The changes in the late nineteenth century were not the first
radical break in China’s interaction with Inner Asia. The
expansion into those realms was part of a monumental trans-
formation initiated by an early modern “Great Game,” pit-
ting the Russians, Qing, and Zunghar Mongols against each
other. The Qing desire for security against Russia and the
Zunghar federation drove multiple changes within state and
economy, and ultimately led to the creation of institutions
that carried out and consolidated the conquests of Mongolia,
Xinjiang, and Tibet. This was a non-linear, contingent, and
controversial process that lasted from Nurhaci’s early
alliance with Khorcin Mongols in 1626 to the final conquest
of Xinjiang in 1759. (12) It was also a process partially driven
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Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial China, Honolulu, University
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by the Manchu background of the Qing imperial clan. The
Qing and their diverse conquest elite, including Han,
Mongols, and Manchu bannermen, originated in the north-
eastern frontier and brought a unique strategic culture and
military capability to ruling China. (13)
If Qing empire-builders had their own contingent reasons for
expanding into Inner Asia, they also developed, through trial
and error, flexible ruling strategies and institutions for each
region. These institutions were always evolving, but generally
speaking, Qing rule in the Inner Asian regions reflected both
a practical approach to ruling diverse peoples and an imperial
ideology designed for a multi-cultural empire. Influential Qing
empire-builders were often reluctant to seek major changes in
local societies, in part because many officials believed that dif-
ferent peoples possessed different “natures” (xing), which jus-
tified policies of segregation and adaptation to indigenous
institutions. (14) Thus, the Qing often empowered local elites,
an approach that certainly modified indigenous political insti-
tutions yet also allowed them to endure. In Mongolia and
Xinjiang, for instance, the Qing adapted to local legal prac-
tices by incorporating aspects of traditional local law. (15)
Not only was the Qing a “pluralist” empire, the Qianlong
emperor conceived of himself as much more than the ruler of
China. Studies suggest he probably identified at least five dis-
tinct subject peoples — Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan,
Turkestani, and, of course, Han Chinese — each sharing equal
membership in the Qing realm. (16) The Qing were often suc-
cessful, moreover, in convincing subject peoples of their legit-
imacy. The court skilfully employed multifaceted and dynam-
ic tactics to attract Mongol support over a period of almost
three centuries. Early Qing leaders engaged Mongol concepts
of divine power as well as their sense of community (ulus) to
construct a Manchu-Mongol alliance. Later, the Qing success-
fully convinced Mongol elites to embrace membership in ban-
ners — bureaucratic systems that transformed mobile, fluid
Mongol communities into territorially fixed entities (“banners”
and “leagues”) under Mongol aristocratic leadership and
Qing supervision. Qing rulers, moreover, patronised Tibetan
Buddhism in ways that led Mongols to identify being Mongol
and Buddhist as naturally connected to being Qing sub-
jects. (17)
Mongol loyalty was not always freely given, and coercion was
employed throughout Inner Asia. In Qinghai, for example,
Tibetan Buddhist monasteries were attacked in order to bring
them under control. The state then classified all people, assign-
ing them to distinct groups as a means of segregating them. In
the process of delimiting territories and establishing banners for
the region’s Mongols, for instance, the Khalkas were separat-
ed from the Khosots. (18) While Qing policies sought stark seg-
regation in some cases, they also exploited important intercon-
nections. For example, the Qing made Mongols, many of
whom practiced Tibetan Buddhism, dependent on Tibetans by
outlawing reincarnating lamas from appearing in Mongolia, a
policy designed to prevent the aristocracy from dominating
both religious and secular institutions. (19)
Clearly, Qing rulers sought to control their diverse subjects,
but they did not formulate coherent policies designed to
assimilate or acculturate them to Chinese ways. While influ-
ential Han bureaucrats did, at times, seek to transform and
assimilate certain south-western indigenous groups, their
efforts were sporadic and often not supported by Manchus
and other elite bannermen — the officials responsible for
Inner Asian frontiers. (20) In Xinjiang, just as in Mongolia,
the Qing adapted to and modified local ruling practices by
developing parallel political and legal institutions. In south-
ern Xinjiang, the Qing appointed Turkestani officials
(begs) to administer the Turki-speaking population. In east-
ern Xinjiang, Han civilians were subject to magistrates as
they would have been in China proper, but hereditary
rulers with princely titles (jasaks) ruled over Mongol com-
munities. (21)
In every case, Inner Asian ruling institutions were devel-
oped through ongoing processes of trial-and-error. Nowhere
is this clearer than in Tibet, where it took decades of con-
flict before the Qing developed a relatively stable approach.
Not until the mid-eighteenth century did the Dalai Lama
institution emerge as the key to administering Tibet. At this
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time, the Dalai Lama and his councillors (bka’-blon) came
to exercise significant ecclesiastical and secular powers, but
did so under the supervision of two Qing imperial residents
(ambans) and a Qing garrison. (22) The Dalai Lama-led gov-
ernment was no longer allowed to administer Kham, how-
ever. In the early eighteenth century, Kham was placed
under Sichuan’s oversight, and the Qing sought to under-
mine Lhasa’s influence by controlling the appointment and
review of local Khampa secular rulers (tusi). These rulers
were to be selected based on imperial guidelines, but, as
Xiuyu Wang notes, local custom continued to dictate power
configurations. Local rulers also continued to monopolise
control over land, law, and, through their personal militias,
the use of force. In other areas of Kham, Tibetan Buddhist
leaders held power, and monastery heads sought to monop-
olise the rights to collect taxes and adjudicate legal mat-
ters. (23)
At times, pluralist approaches to empire were challenged by
men who envisioned the extension of uniform, central gov-
ernment institutions over frontier peoples. Often those pro-
posals were accompanied by plans for Han colonisation or
programs for assimilating non-Han peoples. Thus, there
was disagreement over pluralist policies, but these issues
were usually contested in debates over South and
Southwest China, not Inner Asia. (24) Not until the
Daoguang era (1821-1850) were there serious challenges
to the ideas of pluralism in Inner Asia. In the aftermath of
rebellion in southern Xinjiang, influential proposals were
offered by Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan, who argued for
transforming Xinjiang into a directly administered province
colonised by people from China proper. When Zuo
Zongtang argued for provincialising Xinjiang in 1877, he
drew from these earlier writings to offer a new vision of gov-
ernance. (25)The  ca se of  Xinj i ang
For over a decade beginning in 1864, Xinjiang was beyond
the reach of the Qing central government. Internal rebels
and an invasion by Yaqub Beg’s Khoqand troops desta-
bilised the regime and left it open to British intrigues and a
Russian occupation of Yili in the far northwest. As Zuo
Zongtang’s armies sped westward in 1877, driving before
them Yaqub Beg’s rebel troops, the great statesman was
already laying future plans. On 26 July 1877, Zuo sent the
first of five memorials requesting provincehood for Xinjiang.
Thus began a five-year period of discussion and planning in
which the Qing court examined support for and against the
proposal. Ultimately, a plan for provincialisation — but not
Zuo’s plan — was implemented in 1884. Several aspects of
this process are intriguing, including the initial institutions
designed to stabilise post-war Xinjiang, the debate over
Xinjiang’s future, and the ultimate plans for non-Han inhab-
itants.
The initial institutions for stabilisation were Reconstruction
Bureaus (shanhou ju), managed by Liu Jintang, Zuo’s close
confident and fellow Hunanese. Both Zuo and Liu seem to
have envisioned these Bureaus as institutions for change.
Zuo identified Reconstruction Bureaus with “the belly
lands” (fudi, China proper), perhaps because he had dealt
with them as Governor General in Zhejiang after the
Taiping rebellion. However, the Reconstruction Bureaus in
Xinjiang differed from those with which Zuo had earlier
experience. In 1860s Zhejiang, local elites took part in
establishing Reconstruction Bureaus and pursuing the wel-
fare and political processes necessary for recovery. In time,
the Bureaus were transformed into more permanent “united
welfare agencies” run by local elites who were increasingly
active in managing their communities. In other words, the
Reconstruction Bureau and other post-rebellion institutions
became arenas in which local elites, who were influenced by
“statecraft” scholarship emphasising activism in service of
the state, began to claim responsibility for and power over
important governing processes. (26)
Zuo was also a student of statecraft thinkers such as fellow
Hunanese Wei Yuan (1794-1856), who supported the
broadening of political participation in the name of state-
strengthening; however, Wei’s definition of those who should
participate was limited to urban literati qualified for official
bureaucratic positions. (27) Whether Zuo had Wei’s concepts
in mind or not, his orchestration of the Xinjiang
Reconstruction Bureaus initially paralleled Wei’s ideas.
Following orders from Zuo, Liu Jintang dispatched a network
of expectant officials, men who were candidates for official
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positions in China proper, into the areas that had to be
rebuilt, and these men, linked through a hierarchy of
Reconstruction Bureau networks, engaged in humanitarian
efforts: settling refugees back on the land, rebuilding the
agrarian economy, and ensuring supplies for the army. They
were also authorised to inspect agricultural lands, rebuild
granaries and communications infrastructure, and catch
rebels — responsibilities clearly designed to take power from
local elites, especially the begs of southern Xinjiang. While
the begs were conceived of as important to certain processes,
such as urging people to pay taxes, they were stripped of actu-
al powers, such as the right to collect taxes. The
Reconstruction Bureaus thus brought Han officials and law
to areas that had previously been subjected to “pluralist”
approaches. Zuo’s goal seems to have been to use
Reconstruction Bureaus as a step toward provincialisation. (28)
The Reconstruction Bureaus were temporary, and Zuo
knew he had to convince the court to implement perma-
nent provincial-style administration, but he faced oppo-
nents. One of the more experienced was Li Yunlin, a ban-
nerman with experience in Xinjiang. Li’s reports empha-
sised the devastation wrought in Urumqi and other regions:
few banner armies and Han settlers survived the years of
rebellion. The economy was devastated, the markets over-
grown. Without Han subjects (min) to pay taxes, Li
argued, it was impossible to establish counties, let alone a
province. (29) Li’s emphasis on Han subjects as the founda-
tion for provincial-style government was both practical and
conceptual, for it reflected enduring political beliefs held
by many bannermen: different “types” (zhonglei) of peo-
ple required different forms of government, and the provin-
cial or county system was suitable only for “migrant sub-
jects from the interior (neidi qianju zhi min).” (30) In the
wake of the unrest, Li estimated that fewer than 5,000
Han households still inhabited Xinjiang, a “total not even
equal to a county in China proper.” Historian Sudebilege
characterises Li’s opposition, which was shared by others,
as support for returning to older approaches more in tune
with local customs (yinsu er zhi), and the court adopted
this scepticism by questioning the viability of the provincial
structure. (31)
Over the next several years, Zuo and his Hunanese associ-
ates, Liu Jintang and Tan Zhonglin, hammered away at their
critics, developing a series of arguments that would shape
Xinjiang’s future. Drawing in part from Wei Yuan, Zuo
emphasised strategic defence, internal governance, and fiscal
discipline, but he embedded in his arguments certain crucial
discourses about cultural difference and historical legitima-
cy. (32) As he had in 1875, when some challenged the recov-
ery of Xinjiang, Zuo defended the region’s strategic impor-
tance: Xinjiang protected Mongolia, which in turn protected
the capital district. Xinjiang’s loss would jeopardise the
entire empire. (33) Due to the contemporary international cli-
mate, many believed this. The nineteenth-century “Great
Game” brought Russian and British pressure on Inner Asia,
and Russia had occupied part of Xinjiang in 1871. To avoid
further encroachment, Zuo believed, the Qing should erad-
icate earlier ruling methods, which weakened the state.
When local headmen (begs, jasaks) served as middlemen
between the state and its subjects, Zuo argued, their corrup-
tion undermined state power. To overcome this, the state
should dispatch district magistrates to provide a direct link
between state and people. Explicit in Zuo’s argument was
the idea that both the structure and cultural content of China
proper’s governing institutions were superior. Zuo noted that
regions where “governance according to local traditions [was
implemented] were unable to follow the same traditions
[practiced] in China proper,” and he opposed this. (34) In
Zuo’s mind, moreover, the Qing must strengthen state
capacity and oppose foreign infringement, because China
had maintained a position in Xinjiang since the Han period,
and he thus believed it to be “our ancient soil” (wo jiutu). (35)
In the coming years, Zuo’s protégés, Liu Jintang and Tan
Zhonglin, provided positive news about Xinjiang’s econom-
ic recovery as well as the possibilities for assimilation
(xianghua) by Xinjiang peoples. (36) The opposition to
provincialising Xinjiang was ultimately overcome, and a
modified proposal to link the new Xinjiang Province to
Gansu was approved. Xinjiang would become a province. 
Historians have assessed these changes as monumental,
with James Millward recently suggesting that the decision on
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Xinjiang (and subsequent provincialisation of Taiwan in
1887) “demonstrates that provincialisation of the frontier,
with the concomitant promotion of Han migration and
implementation of Chinese institutions in areas with sizeable
non-Han populations, was part of the beleaguered dynasty’s
attempt to shore up its position on all frontiers.” (37) There
was an alleged shift in approach, away from adjusting admin-
istration to local customs and towards the reproduction of
China proper’s institutions and culture. Liu Jintang, for
instance, not only sought to remove Turkestani begs from
power, but envisioned a comprehensive schooling system
designed to teach Han language and culture. But was the
provincialisation of Xinjiang such a seminal turning point? 
Zuo and his Hunan compatriots had won a political battle
to impose their vision on one Inner Asian territory. To do so,
they had mobilised important rhetorical strategies, arguing
for Xinjiang as ancestral land and for the inherently corrupt-
ing nature of hybrid institutions managed by cultural others.
Both were important, but not unprecedented, developments
in conceiving of region and empire. In earlier times, it was
common for the Yongzheng emperor and his confidantes to
deplore the corruption of culturally-other indigenous leaders
as part of their plans for replacing them with Han magis-
trates. (38) From this perspective, Zuo’s arguments do not
appear entirely novel. However, there is some evidence that
larger contingent and cognitive processes were at work in the
1870s. 
Neither Liu Jintang nor his successors were fully able to
implement their plans. They denied local elites a legitimate
role in political change, but were unable to remove them
from the scene; however, they created an environment in
which local elites actively opposed some imperial policies.
Turkestani Muslims, for instance, resisted compulsory
Chinese schooling and kept their boys away from the new
institutions. In later decades there would be more resistance
to taxes, schools, and the corruption of Chinese officials. By
provincialising Xinjiang without providing legitimate roles or
benefits for local elites, the Qing state created specific points
around which opposition could rally. Meanwhile, the events
seem to have provoked some thought about Islam and the
state in China proper. The contemporary newspaper
Shenbao covered Xinjiang events and openly questioned
whether Muslims undermined the type of cultural and reli-
gious unity that made states strong. (39) Even though some
began to question the place of Muslims in the state, the
process of rebuilding Xinjiang actually allowed Turkestani
settlers more freedom to move from the south into other
parts of Xinjiang, thereby enlarging their demographic foot-
print. In later decades, we are told, this would aid in devel-
oping a sense of ownership over the entire territory. (40)
Meanwhile, Zuo’s proposals, which were not based on rad-
ically new arguments, had met with an opposition whose
methods of thinking — about rulership, territory, and empire
— did not disappear overnight. Xinjiang provided potential
lessons for other frontiers, but this was not the beginning of
an inevitable process of transforming the frontiers into
Chinese provinces. Mongo lia  and Ti be t
One lesson from Xinjiang manifested itself in an awareness
of how foreign powers might manipulate frontier peoples.
When Russia occupied parts of Xinjiang and negotiated
with Yaqub Beg, officials began to see Central and South
Asia as sources of European threat. Zuo Zongtang, for
instance, feared British incursions from India, and he
warned that the British strategy towards China’s inland fron-
tiers, where they sought to control territory, differed from
their approach to the coast, where they sought to control
trade. (41) In the minds of many, strategic vulnerability was
linked to the weakness of Qing state capacity. The need to
build capacity sparked debate over revenue, and opponents
repeatedly argued against provincialisation in regions with-
out sufficient revenue, which, for many policymakers, meant
Han settlers paying land taxes. Thus, talk of state capacity
and revenue often led to discussions about colonisation or
assimilating indigenous populations in the frontiers. 
Beginning in the 1880s, these three interconnected issues —
strategic defence, revenue, and colonisation/assimilation —
were discussed in connection with Mongolia, although it was
not until the first decade of the twentieth century, during the
New Policies (xinzheng) era, that those discussions were
translated into action. The British invasion of Tibet (1903-
1904) and the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) added new
urgency to the process. In each case, however, the specific
policies for transforming Mongolia and Tibet were varied
and piecemeal, suggesting a contested and contingent policy-
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making process. Recent work by Dahpon David Ho is par-
ticularly incisive, stressing that the commitment to transform-
ing Tibet, which culminated in the 1910 invasion of Lhasa,
was not the outcome of coherent and well-planned efforts to
strip political power from ethnic Tibetans. (42) In Mongolia as
well, policies of colonisation and provincialisation were sub-
ject to opposition and modification, with the unintended out-
come that the Qing (and Republican government) found
itself defending hybrid institutions.
The first successful proposal to change Mongolia was made
by Cen Chunxuan in 1902. Cen acted in response to the
threat of Russian aggression, and he proposed opening
tracks of Mongol land to Han cultivation. Although Han set-
tlers already leased lands in places such as Ulaanchab and
Yekhe Juu Leagues, the approval of Cen’s request represent-
ed a breakthrough. Previous Qing administrations had
opposed Han migration to Mongol banner territories, but in
1902 such segregation policies were challenged as the court
sought to stabilise its hold on the North. Land reclamation,
it was believed, would bolster agricultural productivity, thus
increasing revenue for both state and Mongol banners. In
the mind of Yigu, the official sent to oversee reclamation,
the plan would benefit impoverished Mongols while also
allowing the state to increase fiscal and military capacity in
this vital frontier. (43)
Mongol commoners and elites were less sure, and their
resistance shaped the initial implementation of the new poli-
cies. While Yigu confidently created a General Bureau of
Cultivation Affairs (kenwu zongju) in Hohhot and promot-
ed settlement in Chakhar, his plans were thwarted in
Ulaanchab and Yekhe Juu. In Chakhar, most Mongol ban-
ner leaders were appointed by the state, but in the other
Leagues, the nobility was home-grown, and they opposed
reclamation. Though their opposition may have been linked
to financial interests, they deployed the language of plural-
ism to convey their dissatisfaction. They noted that Han set-
tlers would threaten pastoral lifeways, a violation of the Qing
policy of treating all subjects equally (yishi tongren). More
direct resistance was offered by Mongol commoners, whose
vigilante groups (duguilangs or “circles”) were mobilised to
resist the New Policies. In some cases, Mongol opposition
was overcome, but the resistance was a significant reflection
of widespread opposition. (44)
Reaction to the Russo-Japanese War produced new propos-
als for provincialising Mongolia; it also led to new methods
of knowledge production as officials began to conduct sur-
veys of Mongol peoples and lands. An early survey was con-
ducted by Yao Xiguang, who spent three months in Inner
Mongolia assessing the prospects for land reclamation and
mining as well as investigating possible sites for Han settle-
ments. The survey provided the basis for Yao’s proposal that
Mongols be subjected to direct rule and their lands opened
to further Han settlement. It also seems to have set a prece-
dent in which the survey became an important administra-
tive tool. Later, in 1906, the newly-reorganised Ministry of
Dependencies (Lifan bu) dispatched officers to conduct
investigations into Mongolia and Tibet. (45) Thus, the Qing
state was beginning to institutionalise new methods for col-
lecting and producing knowledge about its peripheral peo-
ples and their lands. While the state had collected informa-
tion on its subjects and mapped its imperial lands for many
decades, (46) the surveys of the early twentieth century provid-
ed knowledge that was inserted into new conceptual frame-
works.
In May 1907, Cen Chunxuan submitted the most important
plan for provincialising Mongolia. (47) Cen framed the value
of Mongolia in historical terms, not unlike Zuo’s approach to
Xinjiang three decades earlier. However, Cen was no mere
traditionalist, and he articulated a self-conscious rejection of
earlier concepts of the state. In doing so, he argued that con-
temporary historical conditions were novel and that the
state’s goals must adapt. Within its “sovereign territory” (suo
shu zhi di), the state must establish law, collect information
about the territory, manage defence, and promote develop-
ment. Although Cen claimed, as earlier Qing officials might
have, that the state should concern itself with the people’s
livelihood (minsheng), he also revealed a modern concern
with comprehensive territorial administration, noting that in
“the lands under state jurisdiction…there can be no vacilla-
tion in power.” The comment suggests that Cen conceived
of ideal state authority as equally and consistently applied
across all territories, with none of the unevenness or incon-
sistencies that earlier pluralist approaches allowed. To
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accomplish this, Cen argued for the establishment of three
provinces centred in Inner Mongolia, and an aggressive exten-
sion of land reclamation into Outer Mongolia. Migrants were
to be recruited by merchants, who earned rewards if they met
certain benchmarks in numbers of households settled, acreage
reclaimed, or mines opened. For Cen, the goal was to create
an integrated state administration overseeing a commercial
economy that could support troops, and he seems to have
imagined Han Chinese as the foundation of this system. 
Mongols were not irrelevant, however. Although Cen envi-
sioned them as a simple people ensnared by Tibetan
Buddhist superstitions, he wished to begin transforming
Mongol boys through schooling. Those who graduated from
primary schools could attend middle school and be eligible,
just like banner and Han students, for government appoint-
ments. This, Cen felt, would prevent Mongol boys from join-
ing the monasteries, where their talents went to waste.
Mongol boys might also attend military academies, which
Cen envisioned as institutions for change throughout the
troubled frontier regions — Mongolia, Tibet, and Kham. In
contrast to earlier pluralist policies, which largely sought to
segregate Mongols from China proper, Cen’s plan, and the
New Policies in general, were designed to integrate Mongols
into a strong, new China.
Cen Chunxuan and Yao Xiguang were part of an effort to
reorder Qing territory. Their goal was to militarise the north-
ern boundaries of the empire, and in order to do so, they
mobilised new administrative resources (the survey), envi-
sioned new institutions of assimilation (schools), and pro-
posed to eradicate the “informal arrangements [and] multi-
ple sovereignties” that had once characterised Qing
approaches to Inner Asia. Naturally, there was resistance,
and that opposition, along with the 1911 revolution, made it
impossible to create provinces in Mongolia. When the court
circulated Cen’s memorial, it found broad but not universal
support. The vision of a pluralist empire was still strong, and
opponents of provincial governance for Outer Mongolia
cited its alterity and incompatibility with Chinese ways. (48)
Mongol nobles and commoners resisted as well, and this
resistance forced the Qing to reassess. Instead of removing
Mongol nobles from power, the Qing turned to them to
implement its New Policies, including land reclamation, edu-
cation, and taxation. As the state sought to increase capaci-
ty in Mongolia, it found — as Republican governments would
— imperial institutions difficult to abandon. (49) Nevertheless,
the new thinking behind Cen’s plan did lead to major
changes. New state institutions, including schools, police sta-
tions, and telegram offices, were established, and the legal
barriers that had segregated Mongols from Han Chinese
were eroded. In 1910, the court allowed unrestricted farming
throughout Mongolia, the contracting of pasture land, and
intermarriage between Mongols and Han. Mongols were
legally permitted to learn Chinese and use Chinese sur-
names, and during this period a new generation of Chinese-
educated Mongols emerged. (50)
If the Mongolia case demonstrates the contingencies
involved in provincialisation, then Greater Tibet reveals a
remarkable dichotomy in approaches to changing Inner
Asia. In the aftermath of the British Younghusband inva-
sion, the Chinese press was awash in disaster scenarios. In
October 1904, Liang Qichao’s Xinmin congbao ran an arti-
cle entitled “Grieving for Tibet” in which Tibet’s future was
envisioned as similar to those of the British protectorates in
Nepal and Bhutan. (51) The court responded to British pres-
sure with efforts to clarify Tibet’s status and transform the
administration of Tibet proper and Kham. 
In 1906, Zhang Yintang was dispatched to Lhasa to reinvig-
orate Qing authority. Zhang’s approach was influenced by
attitudes common among his peers such as Cen Chunxuan.
Zhang felt that traditional Tibetan values were quaint at
best, and more often dangerous. He critiqued polyandry and
sexual promiscuity as immoral, trumpeted modern hygiene,
urged new clothing styles to prepare Tibetans for productive
work, and suggested that Chinese language be widely adopt-
ed. Zhang did not, however, seek to force these transforma-
tions through violence (or, at least, he seems to have recon-
sidered the use of troops), and Ho demonstrates how Zhang
developed a number approaches for working with Tibetan
leaders. Zhang apparently embraced certain Tibetan rituals,
such as swearing an oath before the Buddha, and visited the
Tibetan governing bodies to seek their support in transform-
ing government. Warning that Tibet risked a fate similar to
that of Bhutan and Nepal, Zhang recommend an alternative:
Tibetan leadership should endorse political reorganisation
along Chinese bureaucratic lines, and they should reform
Tibetan customs. Zhang was apparently quite persuasive,
and a proposal outlining these changes was sent, with
Tibetan support, to Beijing in April 1907. (52)
Ho’s evidence suggests that Zhang had identified an alter-
native to the Xinjiang and Mongol approaches. In Xinjiang
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and then Mongolia, the Qing sought, albeit unsuccessfully,
to exclude Turkic begs and Mongol nobles from state-build-
ing and transformation processes, but Zhang seems to have
included Tibetans in decision-making and to have encour-
aged, however insensitively, voluntary changes in everyday
practice. (53) As Qing officials sought to re-conceive their
state, many shared the conviction that new centralising
administrative technologies and the transformation of fron-
tier peoples’ lifestyles were necessary. Yet, there were diver-
gent approaches to implementing such changes. Zhang’s
approach in Tibet proper, for instance, differed from Zhao
Erfeng’s use of intense violence in Kham.
By the early twentieth century, imperial power in Kham had
deteriorated, and after 1904, as the Qing sought to reassert
power, Khampas resisted. State efforts to control land and
encourage reclamation provoked the assassination of the
assistant imperial resident. The perpetrators felt the act to be
justified because they were seeking to protect local liveli-
hoods and religious autonomy. In response to Khampa resist-
ance, the Qing sent Zhao Erfeng to Sichuan. Arriving in
1905, Zhao sought to impose state control over resources,
taxation, law, and coercive force. To do so, he used large-
scale violence. In effect, his goals were the same as Cen
Chunxuan’s in Mongolia or Zhang Yintang’s in Tibet prop-
er: to reorient the political, cultural, and economic land-
scape. In regions where secular hereditary rulers (tusi) held
power, Zhao replaced them with Han officials. In regions
where Tibetan Buddhist monastic authority was strong,
Zhao banned monastic participation in government and
legal affairs. Monasteries suspected of anti-Qing activities
were stripped of their lands. This process met with popular
resistance, but Zhao persisted in trying to transform the rela-
tions of power and patronage that linked monasteries to local
communities. To further this, the Qing restructured the legal
system so that Han officials alone had the authority to settle
disputes, and Zhao implemented new regulations to disci-
pline Khampas by criminalising certain traditional practices.
He also promoted colonisation by wresting control of land
from local institutions and providing it to Han military or
civilian settlers. (54)
Thus, there were two different approaches to dealing with
Greater Tibet by 1907. Coercion and violence characterised
Zhao’s removal of indigenous rulers in Kham, while Zhang,
despite his disdain for Tibetan customs, apparently pursued
a policy of negotiation and coercive persuasion. Both men
sought to transform Tibetan society and monopolise for the
central state the right to increase revenue, develop the econ-
omy, and dispense justice, but Zhang Yintang provided
space for the indigenous elites to join this state-building ini-
tiative. In Ho’s account, British observers found both
approaches to be effective, but their successes were quickly
jeopardised by the imperial resident, Lianyu. Ho depicts
Lianyu as a manipulative official who orchestrated Zhang’s
removal from Lhasa, tried but failed to bring Zhao Erfeng
to replace him, and then helped talk the court into invading
Tibet proper in 1910. Each step increased the tensions
between Tibet elites and the Qing. Known as the
“Butcher,” Zhao was not welcome in Lhasa, and the Dalai
Lama sent angry letters of protest to the court. When Qing
troops marched on Lhasa, the Dalai Lama was promised a
peaceful occupation and a preservation of his spiritual pow-
ers, but Lianyu mobilised his own soldiers to attack monas-
teries, thus touching off violence as well as the flight of the
Dalai Lama to India. Lianyu’s goal may have been to intim-
idate and weaken Tibetan power-holders, but his decisions
had extraordinary implications: Ho identifies these incidents
as the first steps toward the violence and enmity that would
poison the Sino-Tibetan relationship throughout the twenti-
eth century. (55)
These new accounts of early twentieth-century Kham and
Tibet suggest that while many imperial officials shared a
vision of modernising Beijing’s relationship with Tibet, there
were different approaches to implementing sovereignty in
these far-flung imperial frontiers. While the goal was to
increase or even transform state capacity in order to protect
against foreign imperialism and assert greater authority over
the political and cultural apparatuses, there was room for an
inclusive strategy that sought cooperation with Tibetan
elites. In Mongolia and Xinjiang, too, some had questioned
policies that replaced the pluralist institutions led by indige-
nous elites with Han-dominated provincial-style government,
and ultimately the state could not bypass Mongol nobles. In
each case, however, the Qing state, despite its history of
flexibility in Inner Asia, still tended toward approaches that
excluded, alienated, or undermined local elites. 
These examples stand in contrast to case studies from con-
temporary China proper. In North China, conditions resem-
bled those found in Inner Asia. In the aftermath of the
Boxer uprising, the state faced foreign occupation, and in
response, officials such as Yuan Shikai sought to reassert
imperial authority and build state capacity. To do this, Yuan
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sought new revenue sources, revamped local administration
to strengthen imperial magistrates, and organised new insti-
tutions of control, such as police forces, to extend govern-
ment capacity at the local level. (56) As this process unfolded,
Yuan developed good working relationships with local elites.
He supported reforms that were attractive to them, such as
new educational institutions. Even though the extension of
state capacity was geographically uneven, Stephen
MacKinnon believes that Yuan was relatively successful in
promoting reforms and appealing to local elites. (57)
A slightly different view of state-elite relations emerges from
Mary Rankin’s work on Zhejiang. In the 1860s, there were
important changes in relations between social leaders (a
“managerial elite”) and the bureaucratic state. Local elites
expanded their activities and networks as they managed
reconstruction and relief efforts after the Taiping uprising.
Initially, elite managers did not consider their activities to be
a challenge to the state, but a contribution to good gover-
nance. By the 1890s, these elites were politicised by the
Sino-Japanese war, and their concerns began to be directed
by a growing nationalism expressed through reformist jour-
nals. Thus, just as the state sought to increase its capacity at
local levels — through the New Policies that influenced
changes in Zhili and Inner Asia as well — managerial elites
called for reform in government, including greater elite par-
ticipation. In Rankin’s view, this demand for greater partici-
pation was largely met as new positions were filled by local
elite managers. Even though the New Policies were intend-
ed to strengthen central government control over local socie-
ty, they provided ways for local elites to expand their role
and make increasing demands on the state. Thus, there were
conflicts between state-building and social mobilisation of
elites, but “both sides desired similar reforms to create a
strong, wealthy, unified China.” Only in the very late Qing
did these mobilising elites turn against the court, a develop-
ment that demonstrated that foreign pressure and the Qing’s
inability to protect China had convinced many elites that
they were more qualified to lead the nation. (58)
In the cases sketched by MacKinnon and Rankin, local Han
elites in China proper were included (or demanded to be
included) in the processes of reform and state-building. Such
inclusion gave them, Rankin argues, the space to take an
increasingly active role in China’s politics and to eventually
demand control over China’s fate. While neither work is a
definitive study, both suggest that late Qing state-building
included bargaining and contention with local Han elites,
whether in Zhili or Zhejiang. In other words, the state was
seeking to increase its capacity, but to do so it had to work
through local elites — by providing some benefits and by allow-
ing elite networks to direct some of the processes. Comparative
studies demonstrate that it is precisely when states seek to
increase capacity that they often must bargain with those who
control resources, whether land, commercial wealth, or capi-
tal. (59) In the case of Han elites in places such as Zhejiang and
Zhili, the bargaining process seems to have given those elites
a legitimate role and stake in the future of the state, even if the
state was no longer run by the Qing court.
For elites in Inner Asia, however, late Qing state-building
did not provide many legitimate roles. Many Mongol elites
and commoners opposed the imposition of new administra-
tive structures, and the state reluctantly delegated to the ban-
ners some responsibilities for its New Policies. Instead of
providing Mongol nobles with an increasing legitimacy and
stake in the future of the state, however, these roles either
undermined them (in Inner Mongolia) or drove them to
revolt (in Outer Mongolia). In both cases, the results were
contrary to the original goals, and the unintended conse-
quences would shape the future of Inner Asia-China rela-
tions. On one hand, there was the establishment of a new
and independent theocratic state in Outer Mongolia. On the
other, the new opportunities for integration with China gave
rise to the “Young Mongols,” a generation of revolutionaries
whose experience in Chinese schools would nurture an ide-
ology of Mongol “racial-revival” and a desire to increase
Mongol control over developments in Inner Mongolia. (60)
Tibetan leaders may have had an early opportunity to “bar-
gain” over their future, but the occupation of Lhasa
destroyed this process and sparked the Thirteenth Dalai
Lama’s exile in India. After initially deposing him, the Qing
then sought his return, but his response to the imperial resi-
dent in Lhasa was emphatic:
You are fully aware of this inexcusable illegal action
taken by your troops; yet you inform me and my min-
isters that the situation…is peaceful. I know that this
has been said to persuade me to return and also I
know that it is false. Because of the above, it is not
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possible for China and Tibet to have the same rela-
tionship as before. (61)
In exile, the Dalai Lama reconsidered Tibetan commitment
to a central Chinese state, and as the 1911 revolution erupt-
ed, he developed a War Department and trained soldiers
who would drive Chinese troops from Tibet in 1912. Thus,
late Qing developments led to Inner Asian elites taking very
different stances on the concept of “China,” just as they also
led Han elites to develop new understandings of Inner Asia.T i be t  in  the m edi a
The social mobilisation of reformist elites in the late Qing
was intertwined with the rise of new media. Journals con-
taining new-style editorials focused on national affairs, and
reformers used newspapers to instruct the public. No longer
were the people, particularly the elite, to be passive in the
face of national affairs. Even after the court censored reform
journals in autumn 1898, crucial newspapers such as Xinmin
congbao were established overseas. By this time, the idea of
a nationally conscious public opinion had emerged, and writ-
ers encouraged broad political participation. (62) The most
important issues included sovereignty, territory, and national-
ism, and the railway rights recovery movement, in particular,
reveals how important the press, especially in Sichuan, was
to nationalist activists. (63) The same journals that focused on
railroads also turned their gaze on foreign imperialist threats
to Inner Asia, especially Tibet.
During the 1890s the volume of Qing writing on Tibet grew
rapidly, and writers urged their reading public to be con-
cerned about Russian and British imperialism as well as the
state’s capacity to develop Inner Asia’s economy and trans-
form its politics. (64) A brief survey of journal articles reveals
writers urging the reading public to make various cognitive
leaps, to acquire new perceptions about the political commu-
nity called China. In Republican times, these efforts would
become more sophisticated, but already people were asked
to conceive of the frontiers as vital national territories, to see
Inner Asian lands as China’s historical soil, to learn about
new methods for collecting knowledge, and to embrace
Tibetans as fellow citizens who, while suffering under rapa-
cious and devious lamas, required assimilation and econom-
ic development. In the process, these writers began to con-
struct important and durable conceptions about Tibetan his-
tory, culture, and religion.
In their editorials, writers lamented foreign pressure on
Tibet, and they developed an important symbolic vocabulary
to explain why others should care, too. Some of the earliest
analysis appeared in the Chengdu newspaper Shuxue bao,
a publication associated with reformist ideas. In a June 1898
article, Wang Rongmao revealed his concerns about growing
British and Russian influence in Tibet, and he urged a num-
ber of steps for securing the region. A first step was to
acknowledge that earlier practices of pluralist rule were
obsolete. To institute direct rule, Wang argued, would
require new types of geographical knowledge, and he sug-
gested as a model Western travel accounts and maps, which
were precise in detail, particularly when it came to sum-
marising regional products, local political conditions, and
geographical features. With this knowledge, Wang implied,
the state could increase security by planting farmer-militia
colonies (tuntian), developing trade, opening mines, and
moving Sichuan’s poor in to build railroads. (65) Wang’s arti-
cle was an early one, but he revealed four concerns that
would become more fully developed over the next decade:
(1) identifying foreign threats as a means to construct Tibet
as vital national territory, (2) emphasising the need for new
forms of knowledge and institutions to reinvigorate decrepit
imperial rule, (3) urging Han migration, and (4) planning
for economic development and modern infrastructure.
Another early opinion piece in Shuxue bao contributed two
other crucial themes: the use of domestic metaphors to help
personalise the importance of Tibet for readers, and an
attack on the Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy. The author, Chen
Qichang, noted that the Russians and British might wrest
Tibet from Qing control, leaving Sichuan province vulnera-
ble. To make this concept more vivid, Chen described
Sichuan as a courtyard and Tibet as the screen (waiping)
protecting it from the street. Without Tibet, Sichuan was
exposed to the outside world, and he therefore urged a poli-
cy that treated Sichuan and Tibet together. To do this, Chen
recommended eradicating the Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy,
although he did envision a future in which local Tibetan lead-
ers emerged to manage their communities. (66)
15N o  2 0 0 8 / 3
62. Judge, Print and Politics, ch. 1; Rankin, Elite Activism, p. 169.
63. Rankin, “Nationalistic Contestation and Mobilization Politics: Practice and Rhetoric of
Railway-Rights Recovery at the End of the Qing,” Modern China, vol. 28, no. 3, July 2002,
pp. 315-361; Danke Li, “Popular Culture in the Making of Anti-Imperialist and Nationalist
Sentiments in Sichuan,” Modern China, vol. 30, no. 4, October 2004, pp. 470-472. 
64. Wang, “China’s Last Imperial Frontier,” pp. 67-68.
65. Wang Rongmao, “Tongchou Shu Zang quanju lun,” Shuxue bao no. 4, June 1898
(Guangxu 24/4/xiaxun), in Qingmo Minchu Zang shi ziliao xuanbian 1877-1919, ed. Lu
Xiuzhang, Beijing, Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2005, [Hereafter QMZS], pp. 2-3.
66. Chen Qichang, “Jing Zangwei yi gu Shujiang yi,” Shuxue bao no. 10 (August 1898,
Guangxu 24/6/xiaxun), in QMZS, pp. 3-6.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
Within a few years, stories about Tibet appeared in papers
with national circulation. In April 1901, Qingyi bao ran a
short story on Tibet’s “strange customs” (qisu) as a means of
familiarising its readership with Tibetan lands and peoples. (67)
The British expedition to Lhasa was covered in Shibao and
Zhongwai ribao, and in October 1904, Xinmin congbao ran
its story, “Grieving for Tibet,” which traced increasing British
and Russian imperialism in Central Asia and emphasised
British transgressions against Chinese sovereignty, including
the direct negotiations with Tibetan officials that produced
the Lhasa Convention (1904). The story criticised the Qing
state for its weak response and placed Tibet within a larger
framework of “grieving” for all Inner Asian territories: the
Japanese were threatening the northeast, the British Tibet,
and the Russians, feeling out-manoeuvred by the other pow-
ers, would probably turn to Mongolia for compensation. The
article further lamented the general public apathy toward
Tibet, an attitude that allowed the British a strategic hold in
the planet’s highest region, from which they could influence
Xinjiang, Sichuan, Yunnan, and through Tibetan Buddhism,
Qinghai and Mongolia. (68)
In general, the coverage of Tibet followed the themes
defined in the Sichuan papers and Xinmin congbao. Writers
constructed Tibet as vital national territory using strategic and
historically-based arguments as well as metaphors identifying
Tibet as a “screen” or wall of the Chinese courtyard home.
They urged fellow citizens to care about Tibet and to realise
the need for collecting new geographical, economic, and
political knowledge about it. Finally, they evaluated Tibetans
and found them wanting. The Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy
received the most criticism, but it was argued that Han,
whether civilian or military settlers, should take responsibility
for developing the Tibetan economy and peoples. 
While writers portrayed Tibet’s relationship with China as an
historical one, they often argued that the contemporary era
was qualitatively different than the past. This self-conscious
awareness of living in a new age, moreover, underpinned
arguments about transforming Tibet. In Dongfang zazhi, a
1906 proposal for provincialising Tibet noted that “since our
dynasty entered Tibet, it did not change the governing insti-
tutions and it did not transform the religion…thus, Chinese
sovereignty in Tibet had an undeserved reputation, and the
lamas had the practical governing power…” (69) This, it was
argued, had invited British and Russians encroachment.
Although Tibet had acknowledged allegiance to China for
almost 300 years, the past could no longer guide the present
— under current conditions, only the construction of direct
rule through provincial institutions would save Tibet. In the
Datong bao, published in Tokyo, the Manchu Rong Sheng
agreed that a new era had dawned, declaring the current age
an “era of national imperialism” (guomin diguo zhuyi shidai)
in which states conquered foreign territory and assimilated
foreign races (yizhong). (70) Rong believed China to be at a
disadvantage in this pursuit, and this made him fearful for the
future. China was, he suggested, like a courtyard dwelling;
the imperialists were thieves seeking to climb the walls and
plunder the house. Only by constructing strong walls in Tibet
and Mongolia could China be preserved. 
The concept of Tibet and Mongolia as “screens” or walls
protecting China proper was widespread, and it harkens
back to earlier concepts about the strategic necessities of the
frontiers, including the role of Xinjiang protecting the
empire, which had been sketched by Zuo Zongtang in the
1870s. (71) But the metaphors of the 1900s were more imme-
diate and intimate — China was a house threatened by ban-
dits, or a body afflicted with illness, as Huang Yanchang sug-
gested in the Chengdu provincial assembly’s paper in
1910. (72) To diagnose and treat an illness, Huang noted, the
physician first inspects the patient, and he urged the
Sichuan provincial assembly to serve as physician by sending
a mission to Tibet. These intimate metaphors were designed
to help readers imagine frontiers affecting their own lives.
Huang linked the body metaphor to the political realities of
his time, arguing through his title that he was concerned
with issues of life and death (cunwang); more specifically,
the new assembly was responsible for protecting Sichuanese
livelihoods, but security in Sichuan was impossible without
a defence of Tibet. Huang’s plea included a short history of
failed Qing policy toward the frontiers, and he accused the
state of being unconcerned about border security, noting that
China had recently lost territory to the Russians (east of the
Usuri River), the French (along the Laotian border), and
the British (the Kachin Hills along the Burma border).
Huang’s demand for an investigative mission reflected a
growing interest in new types of knowledge often identified
with Europeans. In a 1907 Datong bao piece, the author pro-
vided three withering critiques of Chinese approaches to
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“Grieving for Tibet”
Tibet: British missionaries were skilled Tibetan-speakers
while no Qing officials spoke the language. Missionaries had
detailed maps of Tibet, but military officers in Chengdu pos-
sessed none. Important Tibetan events were reported to the
British consuls while the Chengdu civil officials remained
ignorant. (73) True or not, these arguments made a case for
new forms of knowledge, a point made even more forcefully
in Shubao by Huang Yanchang, who suggested that anyone
wanting to investigate the state of Tibet was far better served
by reading foreign reports in translation. (74) While the
Russians, British, and Japanese were secretly investigating
Tibet, Huang continued, Chinese had done nothing. He
therefore prioritised geographical knowledge, including locat-
ing transport routes, ascertaining altitudes, determining soil
fertility, locating mountains and river drainages, and assessing
the material conditions of people’s lives.
If most writers were certain about Tibet’s strategic value and
its ancient connections to China, they were less certain
about the place of Tibetan people in the nation. A 1906
proposal for provincialisation, published in Dongfang zazhi,
characterised Tibetans as “foolish and dull.” (75) To change
Tibet, it was argued, would require new human capital, and
this plan called for Sichuanese to man new garrisons, open
mines, and found schools. Only after Tibet was stabilised
would there be time to focus on transforming Tibetans
through education. This article envisioned a long process of
assimilation as Tibetan students studied simple texts to teach
them Mandarin and were slowly weaned from their religious
superstitions, but it still held out hope that, “once they have
assimilated to some degree, then [we can] use advanced
education to make them purely assimilated.”
While transformed Tibetan commoners were envisioned as
future citizens, the Tibetan Buddhist clergy were excoriated for
a perceived brutality toward their people and insubordination
toward Qing authority. (76) Writers frequently demonized lamas,
particularly the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. Yuan Zhong com-
plained that lamas wallowed in vice and corruption. He
despised the large monasteries for their rich properties and usu-
rious loans that led to enslavement of commoners. Like other
writers, Yuan conceived of a Tibetan people as both blindly
devoted to their religion and deeply unhappy with the Tibetan
Buddhist hierarchy. More importantly for his audience, Yuan
portrayed the Tibetan Buddhist clergy as traitorous for their
connections to the British and Russians — an emphasis not
unique to Yuan. Rong Sheng, for instance, vilified the Dalai
Lama for seeking to expand his religious domain to include
Tibetan Buddhists from India and Central Asia, a plan playing
directly into the hands of the British and Russians. In other pub-
lications, writers suggested methods for aiding Tibetan com-
moners in their escape from exploitation by the religious elite. (77)
The reform press presented ideas that reflected the concepts
that drove Zhao Erfeng and his brutal transformation of
Kham. Zhao seems to have detested indigenous political and
religious institutions, which he felt were designed to keep
ordinary people ignorant and to monopolize resources for a
lazy and unproductive clergy. (While there was some truth to
these beliefs, Zhao’s claim to detest the brutality used against
commoners did not prevent him from slaughtering Tibetans,
too.) Like some in the reform press — and, decades later,
Communist propagandists — Zhao created a simple image of
a Tibet in which commoners were bitter and divided from
their civil and religious governors. (78) This image justified his
efforts to eradicate indigenous ruling traditions and cultural
practices, but these acts provoked chains of events that would
make Kham a violent place for years to come.Co nclus ions
Beginning in 1877, there were numerous proposals for
increasing state capacity in the Inner Asian territories. Most
were designed to replace hybrid institutions with direct
administration resembling the provinces and counties of
China proper. Many plans were also designed to encourage
Han migration and to transform non-Han people. However,
these programs do not represent a single cohesive, long-term
effort to transform Inner Asian realms into China proper.
Zuo Zongtang’s understanding of state-building was based
on late imperial concepts and institutions. He mobilized
qualified literati (often from Hunan) to staff his
Reconstruction Bureaus, and he legitimized his approach
through reflections on the relationship between ruler and
subject. A strong state relied on qualified civil servants who
were less inclined towards corruption than indigenous elites.
A strong army drew its resources from Han settlers who cul-
tivated the land and paid taxes. In many ways, his thinking
mirrored that of the Yongzheng era, when the emperor
sought to standardize the governance of his realm by reform-
ing finances and removing non-Han aristocratic rulers from
their place of mediation between frontier peoples and state.
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In contrast, the men who came later, such as Cen
Chunxuan, operated under a different set of ideas. They
self-consciously imagined themselves to be living in a unique
era in which the justification for building state power, which
included removing hybrid elites, had more to do with new
spatial concepts of the state rather than older concepts of
ruler-minister-subject relations. 
The policies of provincialising Inner Asia were formulated
and implemented in piecemeal fashion. In every case, the
proposals were challenged and modified in the face of oppo-
sition from other policymakers and from people in affected
territories. These contingent processes should be further
scrutinized, because they reveal both different possibilities
for dealing with Inner Asian elites and many unexpected
outcomes. In Xinjiang, land reclamation projects did not
attract enough Han settlers, but they did induce Turkestanis
to move to new areas, a process that would later help bolster
“Uyghur” claims to Xinjiang as a homeland. In Mongolia,
the intricate processes put into motion by land reclamation
and state-building affected Mongols in different ways,
depending on where they lived and who they were. Some
older elite groups, those most likely to have accepted their
status as Buddhist Mongols under the Qing, rebelled to cre-
ate their own empire in Outer Mongolia. New Chinese
schools provided the environment for the rise of a new intel-
ligentsia, who identified with China but also developed a
strong sense of Mongol identity. In Central Tibet, the initial
possibilities for elite involvement gave way to the violence
and treachery of Zhao Erfeng and Lianyu. Such experi-
ences drove the Thirteenth Dalai Lama into exile, where he
developed ideas about establishing Tibetan autonomy. 
The comparative study of state-elite relations is therefore a
promising arena of inquiry for understanding the back-
grounds and experiences of significant groups who would
influence the course of twentieth-century events. It is impor-
tant to realize that there emerged, for the first time in the
late Qing, a significant conception of asymmetry between
Inner Asia and China proper. Mongol, Tibetan, and even
Turkestani elites were perceived as vital elements within the
pluralist empire, which sought to segregate, as best it could,
its various territories and peoples from each other. The poli-
cies of the early twentieth century emphasized integration,
not segregation, and exclusion of hybrid elites from legiti-
mate participation in the state-building process. This exclu-
sion was not irreversible; the Republican state would still
find it necessary to “go imperial” by attracting the support of
Mongol and other non-Han elites. (79) The process of exclu-
sion did, however, lead significant groups in Mongolia and
Tibet to reject older alliances with the Qing, perhaps find-
ing it difficult to conceive of their future in China. In con-
trast, Han elites entered a new era in which they exercised
more authority, bargained with the state, and ultimately
asserted their right (along with revolutionaries) to wrest
China from the Qing. 
In the process, moreover, the journals that reflected and
influenced Han reformist thought began to emphasize the
new, asymmetrical relationship between China and Inner
Asia. If the creation of modern states is, in part, a cognitive
process, then the late Qing is the place to look for the ori-
gins of a modern China that includes Inner Asia as a junior
partner in the nation. Journalists mobilized new metaphors
to encourage the reading public to care about Tibet, and
they endorsed new methods for producing knowledge that
would extend state power over non-Han people. They also
developed discourses — of Tibetans in need of saving from
their superstitions, of the need for Chinese to develop the
Tibetan lands and economy — that now appear durable.
One need not look any further than the March 2008 distur-
bances in Tibet to find related discourses, in state newspa-
pers and some blogs, that demonised the Dalai Lama, urged
increased exclusion of Tibetan elites from legitimate roles in
the region’s future, and criticised ordinary Tibetans for being
ungrateful for all that had been done for them. In the after-
math of these tensions, it may be best to remember Zhang
Yintang or those who opposed the eradication of hybrid
institutions, for a study of the late Qing reveals, somewhat
seductively, that there are other possible paths into the
future. •
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Glossary
cunwang 存亡 • Datong bao 大同報 • Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌
fudi 腹地 • guomin diguo zhuyi shidai 國民帝國主義時代
junxian 郡縣 • kenwu zongju 墾務總局 • Lifan bu 理藩部
min 民 • minsheng 民生 • neidi 內地  
neidi qianju zhi min 內地遷居之民 • qisu 奇俗
shanhou ju 善後局 • Shenbao 申報 • Shuxue bao 蜀學報
suo shu zhi di 所屬之地 • tuntian 屯田 • tusi 土司 • waiping 外屏
wo jiutu 我舊土 • xianghua 向化 • xing 性 • xingsheng 行省
Xinmin congbao 新民叢報 • xinzheng 新政
yinsu er zhi 因俗而治 • yishi tongren 一視同仁
yizhong 異種 • zhonglei 種類
